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Abstract 
Since the passage of the Veterans Readjustment Act of 1952, private accrediting agencies 
have held the purse strings to all federal student aid.  Today, six regional accrediting 
agencies and ten national accrediting agencies act as the gatekeepers of these federal 
monies.  No college or university can access federal funds without receiving the imprimatur 
of one of these recognized accrediting agencies.  Proponents of the current system of 
accreditation argue that the framework presently in place ultimately benefits both students 
and the public at large by fulfilling quality assurance and information signaling functions.  
Applying Yandle’s “Baptists and Bootleggers” model, we examine whether the 
accreditation system in this country exclusively serves the public interest by ensuring that 
institutions are meeting high standards of excellence or whether this system instead serves 
private interests. We begin by briefly outlining the history of accreditation in the United 
States before explaining the public choice lens through which we explore the issue of 
higher education accreditation—Yandle’s Baptists and Bootleggers model.  After 
highlighting the public interest (“Baptist”) arguments many policy advocates have raised 
in favor of accreditation, we consider whether the quantitative and the qualitative evidence 
supports the public interest story.  We then turn to the public choice (“Bootleggers”) 
account of the current accreditation system and argue that the current system of higher 
education accreditation serves as a cartel aimed at keeping the price of a college education 
high, with little incentives for anything beyond minimum quality standards.  We test this 
hypothesis by analyzing the opposition raised by universities and accrediting agencies alike 
to 34 C.F.R.§ 600.9—a regulation promulgated in October 2010 dealing with the state’s 
power to deny federal funds to schools that fail to meet its independent authorization 
requirements, even if the school is already accredited by one of the recognized accrediting 
agencies.  We suggest that the current system of compulsory accreditation should be 
abolished and should be replaced by a system run independently by each state.  Ultimately, 
competition between the states both for students and for new and innovative universities 
would result in reforms that the accreditors have no incentive to pursue under the current 
system.  
 
  
                                                 
1 Pre-print working paper version of Mary Watson Smith and Joshua Hall, “Keeping College Pricey: The Bootlegger 
and Baptist Story of Higher Education Accreditation,” Oklahoma City Law Review 44(1) 2019: 33-66. Please see 
version of record if quoting or citing.  
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Keeping College Pricey: The Bootlegger and 
Baptist Story of Higher Education Accreditation 
 
 
Accreditation, professional licensing, and other tools that regulate the provision of 
services have always been something of a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
they can protect consumers from charlatans and low-quality providers, and in 
technical areas where consumers often do not feel able to judge quality 
accurately—areas such as emergency medical care—they can provide an assurance 
of excellence. On the other hand, however, these tools can also become a barrier to 
entry in a market, enabling existing providers to use licensing to thwart 
competition. When that happens, licensing does not assure quality, but instead 
protects inefficient and inferior products.2 
With these words, Lindsey Burke and Stuart M. Butler frame a question of critical 
importance to students, parents, administrators of traditional universities, and entrepreneurs 
seeking to change the traditional university model.  Who does accreditation really benefit?   
Since the passage of the Veterans Readjustment Act of 1952 (the “Korean War GI Bill”), private 
accrediting agencies have held the purse strings to all federal student aid.3  Today, six regional 
accrediting agencies and ten national accrediting agencies (including four faith-based agencies) 
act as the gatekeepers of these federal monies.4  No college or university can access federal 
funds—nearly $125 billion of aid in 2016 alone—without receiving the imprimatur of one of 
                                                 
2 Lindsey M. Burke & Stuart M. Butler, Accreditation: Removing the Barrier to Higher Education Reform, 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Sept. 21, 2012). 
3 Andrew Gillen, Daniel L. Bennett & Richard Vedder, The Inmates Running the Asylum? An Analysis of Higher 
Education Accreditation, CENTER FOR COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY 4 (Oct. 2010), 
http://www.centerforcollegeaffordability.org/uploads/Accreditation.pdf.  
4 Burke & Butler, supra note 1; Recognized Accrediting Organizations, COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION 
(Mar. 2013), http://www.chea.org/pdf/CHEA_USDE_AllAccred.pdf. 
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these recognized accrediting agencies.5  But why is that a problem?  If these accrediting agencies 
were simply acting as disinterested quality controllers, then there would be no problem.  After 
the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944 (the original “GI Bill”) was passed with very few 
restrictions on where veterans could apply these federal dollars, there were widespread reports 
that diploma mills were receiving much of this money and leaving veterans without an adequate 
education.6  To address this problem, Congress designed the system of accreditation we know 
today—one with the stated public interest purpose of providing quality assurance.7  Proponents 
of the current system of accreditation argue that the framework presently in place ultimately 
benefits both students and the public at large by fulfilling quality assurance and information 
signaling functions.  Applying principles of public choice theory, the goal of this paper is to 
determine whether higher education accreditation really lives up to its public interest promise.  
Specifically, using Bruce Yandle’s “Baptists and Bootleggers” model, we examine whether the 
accreditation system in this country exclusively serves the public interest by ensuring that 
institutions are meeting high standards of excellence or whether this system instead serves some 
other interest.8 
Before exploring this question in Part I, we briefly outline the history of accreditation in 
this country, focusing especially on what the system looked like before the Korean War GI Bill, 
how this system changed after 1952, and how the incentives changed in 1965 for universities 
seeking federal funds.  In Part II, we lay out the public choice lens through which we intend to 
explore the issue of higher education accreditation—Yandle’s Baptists and Bootleggers model.  
                                                 
5FED. STUDENT AID, OFFICE OF THE U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., FEDERAL STUDENT AID ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2016). 
6 Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2. 
7Id. 
8Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, AEI J. ON GOV’T AND SOC’Y 
12-16 (1983), http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1983/5/v7n3-3.pdf. 
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We discuss the public interest (“Baptist”) arguments many policy advocates have raised in favor 
of accreditation in Part III, and after examining data on student performance and other anecdotal 
observations by university administrators and scholars, we consider whether the quantitative and 
the qualitative evidence supports the public interest story.  In Part IV, we turn to the public 
choice (“Bootleggers”) account of the current accreditation system.  We hypothesize that the 
current system of higher education accreditation serves as a cartel aimed at keeping the price of a 
college education high, with little incentives for anything beyond minimum quality standards.  
We test this hypothesis by analyzing the opposition raised by universities and accrediting 
agencies alike to 34 C.F.R.§ 600.9—a regulation promulgated in October 2010 dealing with the 
state’s power to deny federal funds to schools that fail to meet its independent authorization 
requirements, even if the school is already accredited by one of the recognized accrediting 
agencies.  In Part V, considering both the public interest and public choice accounts, we argue 
that the current system of compulsory accreditation should be abolished and should be replaced 
by a system run independently by each state.  Ultimately, competition between the states both for 
students and for new and innovative universities would result in reforms that the accreditors have 
no incentive to pursue under the current system.  
 
I. Background: A Brief History of Accreditation in the United States 
The accreditation system in this country has come a long way since its inception in the 
late nineteenth century.9  As Andrew Gillen, David Bennett, and Richard Vedder observe, 
“Accreditation developed from a need in the late 19th century to define what a college-level 
                                                 
9 Burke & Butler, supra note 1. 
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education was and to distinguish institutions that possessed adequate capabilities for undertaking 
such studies.”10  At this time, accreditation was simply a voluntary means for universities to 
group themselves together with other similarly situated institutions.11  In an era without school 
rankings, accreditation allowed “serious educational institutions to differentiate themselves from 
institutions that were ‘colleges’ in name only.”12  By the turn of the twentieth century, many of 
these regional accrediting associations had developed common institutional standards they 
required both member institutions and colleges seeking membership to meet.13  These standards 
generally measured “quality” in terms of inputs, and thus, to ensure uniform “quality,” these 
accrediting associations required minimum standards in areas such as faculty size, library size, 
length of academic programs, and endowment size.14  Discussing these early standards, Gillen, 
Bennett, and Vedder note that because no federal money was at stake at this time, the standards 
were not adopted with a public accountability purpose.15  Rather, accreditors at the time “were 
mostly concerned with distinguishing among classes of institutions.”16  Thus, because 
“[c]olleges that could afford vast libraries, credentialed teachers, etc. were quite different from 
                                                 
10 Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 3. 
11 See Joshua C. Hall, Higher-Education Accreditation: Market Regulation or Government Regulation?, 17 THE 
INDEPENDENT REVIEW 233 (2012).  
12Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work and What Policy Makers Can Do About It, AM. COUNCIL OF TRUSTEES AND 
ALUMNI 12 (July 2007) [hereinafter Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work], 
http://www.goacta.org/images/download/why_accreditation_doesnt_work.pdf. (“America’s accreditation system 
emerged in the late 19th century as a voluntary system for serious educational institutions to differentiate themselves 
from institutions that were ‘colleges’ in name only. There was a competition among the private accrediting 
organizations that enabled market forces to maintain a necessary level of quality. The knowledge that institutions 
could drop accreditation kept associations from becoming dictatorial or attempting inappropriately to influence the 
content of education.”).  
13Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 3. 
14 Id. at 3, 8 (“It is also useful to note that of the standards that were adopted, the vast majority were quantitative 
measures of inputs and financial resources, with a few standards pertaining to degree requirements or outcomes.”); 
see id. at 11. 
15 Id. at 8; see also Judith Eaton, Accreditation, Professional Interest and the Public Interest: Conflict or 
Convergence?, COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION ACCREDITATION (Oct. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Conflict or 
Convergence?], http://www.chea.org/ia/IA_103006v2.htm. .  Eaton, the President of CHEA (an advocacy group for 
accreditors), reveals that accreditation was created “first and foremost, to serve higher education institutions and 
programs.” 
16Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 7. 
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those that could not,” these measures adequately served the accreditors’ purposes.17  At the same 
time, competition among accrediting associations “enabled market forces to maintain a necessary 
level of quality.”18 
In 1952, Congress sought to impose a new purpose on these private accrediting 
associations—that of ensuring public accountability—and concomitantly set in motion a new 
system that no longer relied on market forces to ensure the accreditors’ commitment to quality.19  
Following the passage of the original GI Bill in 1944, there were widespread reports that the 
federal student aid granted to veterans was often going to diploma mills that did not provide 
these former servicemen with an adequate education.20  Under the original GI Bill, the only 
restriction on an institution’s eligibility to receive federal student aid was that of state 
authorization and, at that time, according to Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder, receiving state 
authorization was little more than a formal requirement.21  The Korean War GI Bill of 1952 
completely changed the accreditation landscape.  No longer were the states the exclusive 
regulators of higher education.22 Instead, the bill required the Commissioner of Education to 
publish a list of nationally recognized accrediting associations to which would fall the task of 
                                                 
17 Id. at 7-8. 
18 Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work, supra note 11.  See Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 13 (“Those 
institutions that were accredited by reputable accreditors stood out as better than those that were not (or were 
accredited by a lesser accrediting body).”). 
19Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 8, 29 (“Some critics of accreditation have thus described the regional 
accreditation system as cartel-like, with each accreditor granted a regional monopoly with a guaranteed market for 
customers without having to provide much benefit. As a result, there is little to no competition between accreditors 
for the right to certify a college or university as eligible for federal student aid.”). 
20 John Aubrey Douglass, The Rise of the For-Profit Sector in US Higher Education and the Brazilian Effect, 47 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF EDUCATION 242, 243-44 (2012).  
21 Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2. 
22 Barbara Brittingham, Accreditation in the United States: How did we get to where we are?, 145 NEW DIRECTIONS 
FOR HIGHER EDUCATION 7, 21 (2009) (“The federal program to recognize accrediting organizations … began 
quietly. From what has been called the second GI Bill, providing support for returning veterans from the Korean 
War, the federal government began to rely on accreditation organizations to identify institutions educationally 
worthy of taxpayer investment in the form of federal financial aid to students.”)  
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determining the schools eligible to receive federal student aid.23  Accordingly, Commissioner Ed 
McGrath later named the six accrediting agencies that currently oversee the regional 
accreditation system that prevails today.24 
Despite assuming this new public accountability function, the standards employed by the 
agencies remained relatively unchanged.25  As Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder put it, “To get 
accredited, one basically had to mimic other colleges in terms of input usage.”26  These costly 
requirements discouraged both diploma mills and legitimate upstart colleges from seeking 
accreditation.27  Because the federal funds dispersed at this time were both limited and 
temporary, it was simply not worth it to these smaller institutions to go through the costly 
process of accreditation.28  In 1965, with the passage of the Higher Education Act (“HEA”), the 
federal government established a permanent system of federal student aid that promised massive 
amounts of federal funds to accredited colleges and universities, who alone were eligible to 
receive it.29  If the 1952 Korean War GI Bill changed the accreditation landscape, then the 1965 
HEA completely changed the game.  As Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder observe, “Whereas in 
earlier years colleges would only take part in accreditation if the benefits (e.g. signaling quality 
                                                 
23 Matthew W. Finkin, Federal Reliance on Voluntary Accreditation: The Power to Recognize as the Power to 
Regulate, 2 J.L. & EDUC. 339, 346 (1973).  
24 Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2.  Although not required by the 1952 Korean War GI Bill, the regional 
accreditation system established by the Commissioner of Education meant the end of competition between 
accreditors for member universities and member colleges. 
25 Id. at 9. 
26 Id. 
27Id. at 4-5. 
28 Id.; see also Letter from R.W. Kent, Director, Essex County Vocational Schools, to H. Alexander Smith, U.S. 
Senator (May 23, 1952) in Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Veterans’ Education and Rehabilitation 
Benefits of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare United States Senate, 82nd Cong. 102 (1952) (“It would be 
very easy for a group of fly-by-night profit schools to set up an accrediting agency that would look good on the 
surface but would accredit substandard schools and thereby dodge completely the provision of this section…I realize 
that under present conditions, where we are not in an all-out shooting war that the number of veterans involved may 
not be large enough to induce some of the abuses we had under the old GI bill. However, it seems to me this new 
legislation should be made foolproof so that if we should get into a shooting war, we will be prepared to prevent 
repetition of these abuses.”).  
29Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 4-5. 
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and/or helping the institution) outweighed the costs, accreditation was now viewed as a near 
necessity, regardless of its benefits in these dimensions.” 30  Since 1965, universities of all kinds 
have had a powerful incentive to pursue accreditation, and the accrediting agencies have enjoyed 
a captive audience on whom to impose their standards.31 
 
II. The Public Interest Story and Its Problems 
A. What Public Goods Do Accreditors Claim to Provide? 
In order to determine whether or not the current system of accreditation has lived up to its 
public interest promise, we must examine what exactly that public interest promise is.  What 
public goods do accreditors claim to provide?  
According to Judith Eaton, a leading advocate in favor of accreditation and the President 
of the Council of Higher Education Accreditation (“CHEA”),32 “When accreditation was created 
100 years ago, it sought, first and foremost, to serve higher education institutions and 
programs.”33  As Eaton explains, “Accreditation was and is routinely acknowledged by higher 
                                                 
30Id. at 6. 
31See id. at 4 (“[W]ith the passage of the 1965 Higher Education Act (HEA), accreditation would become a near 
necessity.”); Burke & Butler, supra note 1 (“Once a voluntary decision on the part of universities, accreditation is 
now a de facto requirement for institutions to be eligible even to open their doors or for their students to receive 
federal aid.”); Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work, supra note 11, at 12 (“Because this happened at a time when the 
importance of student aid in college budgets was growing, accreditation changed from a voluntary service to a 
nearly universal obligatory review.  Since students who attend unaccredited colleges are ineligible for federal 
student aid, a loss of or failure to receive ‘accredited’ status would be a death knell for many institutions.”).    
32 The Council of Higher Education Accreditation (“CHEA”) is a “national advocate and institutional voice for 
promoting academic quality through accreditation.”  CHEA At-A-Glance, Council of Higher Educ. Accreditation, 
https://www.chea.org/userfiles/uploads/chea-at-a-glance_2015.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).  With membership 
that consists of three thousand degree-granting member institutions, it is the largest institutional higher education 
membership organization in the United States.  Id. 
33Conflict or Convergence?, supra note 14; see also Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 4 (“By 1945, the 
North Central Association’s rhetoric had shifted from that of assuring high quality to that of ‘providing service’ to 
its member institutions. During this time, accreditation increasingly sought to accomplish continued improvement in 
higher education rather than the rigid enforcement of universal standards. In doing so, a new mission for 
Smith/Hall 9 
 
education as its primary means to assure academic quality.”34 Thus, accreditation serves the 
higher education community by acting as a mechanism for academic quality assurance and for 
quality improvement.35 
Because, as accreditors argue, accreditation signals academic quality,36 accreditors serve 
the public interest by identifying to students, to the federal government, and to members of the 
private sector those institutions or programs that meet “at least threshold standards for [their] 
facult[ies], curricul[a], student services, and libraries.”37  Accreditation benefits consumers by 
separating those institutions they can trust from those they cannot trust.  Indeed, as a recent 
CHEA promotional video put it, “Being accredited means you can trust what the school or 
program tells you about its courses, its teachers, the services it provides, and what tuition and 
other fees will cost.”38  Since 1952, accreditation has also served an important function for the 
government.39  With over $100 billion disbursed every year in federal student aid, accreditors 
provide assurance to the government that only quality institutions have access to these federal 
                                                 
accreditation was added: In addition to sorting colleges by quality as before, it was now also supposed to help 
institutions improve.”). 
34Conflict or Convergence?, supra note 14; see also Accreditation, OFFICE OF POSTSECONDARY EDUC., 
http://ope.ed.gov/accreditation/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (“The goal of accreditation is to ensure that education 
provided by institutions of higher education meets acceptable levels of quality. Accrediting agencies, which are 
private educational associations of regional or national scope, develop evaluation criteria and conduct peer 
evaluations to assess whether or not those criteria are met.”). 
35Conflict or Convergence?, supra note 14 (“[A]ccreditation itself is a community of professionals, men and women 
who have considerable expertise and experience in quality review, assessment, quality assurance and quality 
improvement.”).   
36 Judith Eaton, Accreditation and Recognition in the United States, COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION 18 
(2016) [hereinafter Accreditation and Recognition], http://www.chea.org/userfiles/uploads/AccredRecogUS.pdf  
(“Accreditation is the primary means by which colleges, universities, and programs assure quality to students and 
the public.”).  
37Id.  
38Accreditation and Its Value to You, COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUC. ACCREDITATION (Feb. 3, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yGGfBNTLSBI. 
39See Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 4. 
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dollars.40  Further, accreditation “[e]ngender[s] private sector confidence” in that it provides 
employers with a tool for measuring the credentials of job applicants and for deciding whether to 
offer tuition support to employees pursuing additional education.41 
All of the benefits cited by accreditors, however, depend critically on the efficacy of the 
accreditor’s quality assurance measures.  Is an accrediting agency’s stamp of approval actually 
reflective of an institution’s quality?42 
B. Is Accreditation an Accurate Indicator of Institutional Quality? 
The accrediting agencies would respond with a resounding “yes!”  But, it is important to 
understand how these agencies measure “quality.”  As many scholars and commentators have 
noted, the accrediting agencies largely measure “quality” in terms of inputs43—that is, for 
                                                 
40Accreditation and Recognition, supra note 35, at 21 (“It adds value to the society through assuring quality, 
enabling government to make sound judgments about the use of public funds, aiding the private sector in decisions 
about financial support and easing transfer of credit.”). 
41Id. at 19.   
42See Accreditation and Its Value to You, supra note 36 (“When a college, university, or vocational school says that 
it is ‘accredited,’ it is saying it has been reviewed by experts and has a seal of approval.”). 
43See Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 9; Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work, supra note 11, at 6; Burke & 
Butler, supra note 1; George C. Leef & Roxana D. Burris, Can Accreditation Live Up to Its Promise?, AM. COUNCIL 
OF TRUSTEES AND ALUMNI 13 (Jul. 2002), 
http://www.goacta.org/images/download/can_accreditation_live_up_to_its_promise.pdf. 
Smith/Hall 11 
 
example, the size of an institution’s physical infrastructure,44 the size of its non-faculty staff,45 
the size of its faculty,46 the workload intensity both of faculty and of administrative staff,47 the 
qualifications of faculty,48 the length of degree programs,49 and the institution’s commitment to 
                                                 
44See, e.g., 2013 Handbook of Accreditation, W. ASSOC. OF SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES (2013) [hereinafter WASC 
Handbook], https://www.wscuc.org/book/export/html/924 (“3.5 The institution provides access to information and 
technology resources sufficient in scope, quality, currency, and kind at physical sites and online, as appropriate, to 
support its academic offerings and the research and scholarship of its faculty, staff, and students. These information 
resources, services, and facilities are consistent with the institution’s educational objectives and are aligned with 
student learning outcomes.”); Resource Manual for the Principles of Accreditation: Foundations for Quality 
Enhancement, S. ASSOC. OF COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS COMMISSION ON COLLEGES 30 (2012) [hereinafter SACS 
Manual], http://www.sacscoc.org/pdf/Resource%20Manual.pdf (“2.11.2.  The institution has adequate physical 
resources to support the mission of the institution and the scope of its programs and services.”); id. at 84 (“3.11.3.  
The institution operates and maintains physical facilities, both on and off campus, that appropriately serve the needs 
of the institution’s educational programs, support services, and other mission-related activities.”); Northwest 
Commission on Colleges and Universities Standards for Accreditation, N.W. COMMISSION ON COLLEGES AND 
UNIVERSITIES (2010) [hereinafter NWCCU Standards], http://www.nwccu.org/accreditation/standards-
policies/standards/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2018)  (2.G.1 Consistent with its mission, core themes, and characteristics, 
the institution creates and maintains physical facilities that are accessible, safe, secure, and sufficient in quantity and 
quality to ensure healthful learning and working environments that support the institution’s mission, programs, and 
services”); id. (“2.G. 3 The institution develops, implements, and reviews regularly a master plan for its physical 
development that is consistent with its mission, core themes, and long-range educational and financial plans.”).  
45See, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 77 (institution must have a “sufficient number” of qualified library 
staff); id. at 79 (institution must have a “sufficient number” of qualified student affairs staff); WASC Handbook, 
supra note 43, ¶3.1 (institution must have “sufficient number” of staff); NWCCU Standards, supra note 43, at ¶ 
2.B.1 (“sufficient number of qualified personnel”). 
46See, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 24 (“2.8.  The number of full-time faculty members is adequate to 
support the mission of the institution and to ensure the quality and integrity of each of its academic programs”); 
WASC Handbook, supra note 43, at 18 (“3.1…. The faculty and staff are sufficient in number, professional 
qualification, and diversity to achieve the institution’s educational objectives, establish and oversee academic 
policies, and ensure the integrity and continuity of its academic and co-curricular programs wherever and however 
delivered..”); NWCCU Standards, supra note 43, at ¶ 2.B.4 (institution employs appropriately qualified faculty 
sufficient in number).   
47See, e.g., WASC Handbook, supra note 43 (“3.2  Faculty and staff recruitment, hiring, orientation, workload, 
incentives, and evaluation practices are aligned with institutional purposes and educational objectives.”) (emphasis 
added); see also NWCCU Standards, supra note 43, at ¶ 2.B.5 (“Faculty responsibilities and workloads are 
commensurate with the institution’s expectations for teaching, service, scholarship, research, and/or artistic 
creation.”). 
48See, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 68 (“3.5.4.  At least 25 percent of the course hours in each major at the 
baccalaureate level are taught by faculty members holding an appropriate terminal degree, usually the earned 
doctorate, or the equivalent of the terminal degree.”); id. at 72 (“3.7.2…. When determining acceptable 
qualifications of its faculty, an institution gives primary consideration to the highest earned degree in the 
discipline.”). 
49See, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 18 (associate’s degrees must be at least 60 hours or the equivalent, 
bachelor’s degrees must be at least 120 hours or the equivalent, master’s degrees must be at least 30 hours or the 
equivalent, and institutions must provide a justification for “all degrees that include fewer than the required number 
of semester hours or its equivalent unit.”); id. at 20 (institution must require fifteen hours of “general education” 
courses for an associate’s degree and thirty hours of such courses for a bachelor’s degree); NWCCU Standards, 
supra note 43, at ¶ 2.C.9. 
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strategic planning for the future.50  While these requirements do succeed in driving up the cost of 
education, they are dubious measures of an institution’s capacity to teach students meaningful 
skills.51 As Leef and Burris argue,  
The accreditation system is not based on an evaluation of the results of an 
institution, but rather upon an evaluation of its inputs and processes. If the inputs 
and processes look good, acceptable educational quality is assumed. It is as if an 
organization decided which automobiles would be allowed to be sold by checking 
to make sure that each car model had tires, doors, an engine and so forth and had 
been assembled by workers with proper training—but without actually driving 
any cars.52 
This is not to say that the accrediting agencies completely ignore student outcomes.  In response 
to concerns that the accrediting agencies were not properly gauging academic quality, in 1992, 
Congress passed a new amendment to the Higher Education Act, requiring accreditors to chart 
student learning outcomes.53 As Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder suggest, however, “the college 
lobby has ensured that these are self designed assessments.”54  In other words, although an 
accreditor now must obtain data from institutions concerning student achievement, the standards 
the institution must meet are based on the school’s own evaluation of its success at meeting the 
                                                 
50See, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 16 (“The institution engages in ongoing, integrated, and institutionwide 
research-based planning and evaluation processes that (1) incorporate a systematic review of institutional mission, 
goals, and outcomes; (2) result in continuing improvement in institutional quality; and (3) demonstrate the 
institution is effectively accomplishing its mission.”); NWCCU Standards, supra note 43, at § 3.A. 
51 Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 9 (“It should go without saying that just because a university spends 
enough money on libraries or research, or has ‘low enough’ teaching loads does not guarantee that it is providing an 
education worth the public’s (or even the student’s personal) investment.”).   
52 Leef & Burris, supra note 42, at 7.  
53 See Matthew W. Finkin, The Unfolding Tendency in the Federal Relationship to Private Accreditation in Higher 
Education, 57 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 89, 102-03 (1994). 
54 Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 9. 
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goals that it set for itself.55 The problem with this method of evaluation, as Leef and Burris 
reason, is that it gives an institution the incentive to cheat on quality:  
The difficulty with reliance on schools themselves to police educational quality is 
that they have a strong incentive to make themselves look good to accreditors 
(and other outside observers), while offering the kind of easy, entertaining courses 
that many students expect and even demand. Schools will comply with whatever 
standards the accreditors may write regarding student achievement, while at the 
same time continuing to offer the sort of easy-going courses that satisfy most 
students.56 
Because the accreditors only require this vague self-policing, agencies have no way of ensuring 
uniform educational outcomes across institutions.57  Further, the accrediting agencies do not 
                                                 
55Id. at 9-10; see, e.g., SACS Manual, supra note 43, at 93 (“4.1.  The institution evaluates success with respect to 
student achievement consistent with its mission. Criteria may include: enrollment data; retention, graduation, course 
completion, and job placement rates; state licensing examinations; student portfolios; or other means of 
demonstrating achievement of goals.”); Standards for Accreditation, NEW ENGLAND ASSOC. OF SCHOOLS AND 
COLLEGES § 2.6 (2016) [hereinafter NEASC Standards], https://cihe.neasc.org/standards-policies/standards-
accreditation/standards-effective-july-1-2016 (“The institution regularly and systematically evaluates the 
achievement of its mission and purposes, giving primary focus to the realization of its educational objectives.  Its 
system of evaluation is designed to provide valid information to support institutional improvement.  The institution’s 
evaluation efforts are effective for addressing its unique circumstances.  These efforts use both quantitative and 
qualitative methods.”).  Similarly, WASC relies on a system of self-reporting to ensure compliance with its 
standards. See Compliance with Standards: Review under the WSCUC Standards and Compliance with Federal 
Requirements; Inventory of Educational Effectiveness Indicators, WASC Handbook, supra note 43. 
56 Leef & Burris, supra note 42, at 22. 
57 Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 10 (“The Spellings’ Commission on the Future of Higher Education 
was highly critical of the system’s failure to provide ‘solid evidence, comparable across institutions, of how much 
students learn in colleges or whether they learn more at one college or another.’”). In recent years, the regional 
accreditors have focused more on the language and process of assessment. See, e.g., The Changing Context for 
Accreditation, WASC Handbook, supra note 43 (“A new context for higher education has formed the backdrop for 
the 2013 Handbook. Colleges and universities have been under increasing pressure to become more accountable for 
student academic achievement; to be more transparent in reporting the results of accreditation; and to demonstrate 
their contribution to the public good. Accounting for quality is a matter of public trust, given the billions of dollars 
government provides higher education through direct investment in institutions, federal and state financial aid for 
students, and tax exemptions for public and non-profit institutions. These factors lie behind the Commission’s 
decision to rebalance the dual role of accreditation to support both public accountability and institutional 
improvement.”). While the accreditation guidelines speak of high-quality learning, what that means is still the 
results of self-assessment. See, Student Success: Student Learning, Retention, and Graduation, WASC Handbook, 
supra note 43,  
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undertake a course-by-course evaluation of a school’s programs to ensure overall academic 
rigor.58  In short, much of the “quality” that accrediting agencies seek to maximize (e.g., 
financial resources, faculty staffing levels, physical infrastructure is not meaningful relative to 
student learning and performance—performance that has markedly declined in recent years.59 
C. Weighing the Costs of Accreditation. 
Having considered the benefits of accreditation apart from the access it provides to 
federal funds, we now briefly consider its costs.  Accreditation imposes both direct and indirect 
costs on colleges and universities.60 Whereas direct costs include expenditures for membership 
fees, site visits, and evaluations, indirect costs involve the much more substantial spending 
necessary to comply with an accreditor’s recommendation (e.g., the cost of building a new 
building at the recommendation of an agency).61  According to Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, the 
direct yearly cost to universities is fairly low—around $63,000 per institution.62 
The indirect costs of compliance, however, are both far more substantial and far more 
difficult to quantify as they also entail significant opportunity costs.63  As ACTA points out, with 
                                                 
58 Burke & Butler, supra note 1 (“[T]he general problem is that once an institution is accredited, its courses are as 
well—no matter whether the content or quality of a specific course reaches the standard implied by accreditation.”) 
(citing courses entitled “Lady Gaga and the Sociology of Fame” and “The Science of Superheroes”); see, e.g., Jack 
Butler, College Offers Course Devoted Entirely to Pornography, THE COLLEGE FIX (Mar. 29, 2013), 
http://www.thecollegefix.com/post/13039 (“[The instructing professor at WASC accredited Pasadena City College] 
said he hopes students come out of the course with a better personal understanding of some of the seminal issues of 
pornography, such as: ‘why we love porn … why some people are deeply troubled by it … and how both to make 
decisions about porn in their own lives and how to have conversations about porn with others.’”). 
59 Hank Brown, The Rise of the Accreditor as Big Man on Campus, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 2013. (“According to the 
2003 National Assessment of Adult Literacy, conducted by the Department of Education's National Center for 
Education Statistics, the literacy of college-educated citizens dropped significantly between 1992 and 2003. Of 
college graduates, only 31% were classified as proficient in reading compared with 40% in 1992.”). 
60 Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 23. 
61 Id. 
62Id.; see also Terry W. Hartle, Accreditation and the Public Interest: Can Accreditors Continue to Play a Central 
Role in Public Policy?, 40 PLANNING FOR HIGHER EDUCATION J. 16, 19 (2012). 
63Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 23. 
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the decreasing number of professors available to teach courses, some universities have had to 
consolidate class sections, increasing the size of classes to make up for the short fall.64  Thus, 
accrediting mandates have forced many students to bear the cost of learning in larger classes.  
Although there has been little empirical research done as to what effect larger class sizes have on 
a college student’s ability to learn,65 intuitively, as one University of Richmond study recently 
found with respect to college business classes, larger class sizes affect the clarity of 
presentations, the effectiveness of teaching methods, the instructor’s ability to keep students 
interested, and the timeliness of feedback.66 
The cost to new universities of obtaining accreditation is substantial. As Michael 
Clifford, an investor in for-profit colleges, has estimated, the cost to a new school to obtain 
accreditation is about $10 million and ten years of effort with “only a 50-50 chance of 
success.”67  But, it is not solely new schools that bear these costs.  Even schools with pristine 
academic credentials bear substantial costs as a result of accreditation.  Stanford University, 
universally ranked as one of the top five universities in the world, spends roughly eight cents of 
every tuition dollar on accreditation.68  Fortunately, the costs imposed by accreditation do not 
                                                 
64Why Accreditation Doesn’t Work, supra note 11, at 9. 
65See Eric P. Bettinger &Bridget Terry Long, Mass Instruction or Higher Learning? The Impact of College Class 
Size on Student Retention and Graduation, 13 EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 97-118 (Winter 2018) (finding an 
increase in college class size increases dropout rates and a reduction in on-time degree completion); Giacomo De 
Giorgi, Michele Pellizzari & William Gui Woolston, Class Size and Class Heterogeneity, 10 J. OF EUR. ECON. 
ASS’N 795-830 (2012) (Italian study finding significantly lower wages and less achievement after graduation 
correlated with how large introductory lectures were).  
66 James Monk & Robert Schmidt, The Impact of Class Size and Numbers of Students on Outcomes in Higher 
Education, 2011(11) B.E. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY, 
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1043&context=economics-faculty-publications..  
67See Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 22; Daniel Golden, Your Taxes Support For-Profits as They Buy 
Colleges, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 4, 2010).  As Clifford reveals in his interview with Golden, he has participated in the 
acquisition of four debt-ridden non-profit universities. Clifford has found that buying these non-profit colleges is the 
most cost-effective way for a for-profit school to obtain accreditation. 
68 Richard DeMillo, Accreditation—or Real Quality Assurance?, POPE CENTER (Jan. 16, 2013), 
http://www.popecenter.org/commentaries/article.html?id=2792; see also Shirley M. Tilghman, President, Princeton 
University, Remarks at Reinvention Center Conference (Nov. 9, 2012) (“Let me quote from a letter that John 
Etchemendy, the provost of Stanford University, sent to WASC last year, highlighting their experience with 
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threaten the very existence of schools like Stanford or Princeton.  As Richard Vedder suggests, 
one cannot say the same for smaller liberal arts colleges like Urbana University.69 With forty-one 
percent of its students receiving Pell Grants and an endowment of less than $3,000 per student, 
Urbana certainly could not survive without accreditation.70  Yet, the cost of maintaining 
accreditation looms large: “[O]ften inane accreditation procedures that are minor annoyances to 
Princeton can be significant cost factors to a school like Urbana.”71 
With large cost and unclear benefits in terms of quality assurance, one must wonder why 
such a system persists.  Why would Congress and why would regulated institutions want such an 
inefficient system? 
III. Bootleggers and Baptists 
In 1983, Bruce Yandle asked himself this same question as he reflected on the tendency 
of government officials to choose the highest cost regulatory approach they can find.72  He 
recalled that, at first, he thought that this behavior suggested a tremendous ignorance of basic 
economic principles on the part of these regulators.73  As he conversed with many of them, 
however, he learned to his surprise that “many regulators knew quite a bit about economics.”74  
Even more shocking, after talking with many industry representatives, he learned that those 
                                                 
reaccreditation: ‘We have been engaged in our reaccreditation project for more than four years and have 
approximately two more years until we are finished. . . . With three submissions and two visits, it is hard to find peer 
reviewers willing to be part of the process because of the duration of the review. . . . In one count a few years ago, 
we determined that the cost of staff time devoted to the accreditation process in that year alone was nearly $849,000. 
Furthermore, this figure only describes staff and faculty whose effort is partially allocated to the process, and does 
not account for the time and effort of more than 50 faculty and staff who are working on the accreditation review in 
less formal roles. Thus the true expense is far greater on an annual basis and the opportunity cost is incalculable.’”). 
69 Richard Vedder, Princeton and Urbana Universities: A Tale of Two Schools, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER 
EDUCATION (Feb. 24, 2012).  
70Id. 
71Id. 
72 Yandle, supra note 7, at 13. 
73Id. 
74Id. 
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regulated “were not always opposed to the costly rules [imposed by these government regulators] 
and occasionally were even fearful that we would succeed in getting rid of some of them.”75  
Initially, these insights puzzled Yandle.76  Why would the government choose to implement 
policies that seem more costly when more efficient approaches were available?  And why would 
regulated industries prefer these costly measures? 
Considering these insights, Yandle developed a new way of understanding the incentives 
that drive both the regulators and the regulated.  Originally, he had thought that “the regulators 
really intended to minimize costs but somehow proceeded to make crazy mistakes.”77  Under his 
new theory, he “began to assume that they were not trying to minimize costs at all—at least not 
the costs [he] had been concerned with.”78  Instead, the regulators were concerned with 
minimizing their costs—that is, the costs of making a mistake, the costs of enforcement, and 
political costs.79  Regulators, Yandle suggested, often prefer simple rules applied across the 
board because “simple rules…require fewer decisions where mistakes can be made.”80  
Likewise, simple rules are easier to enforce than those that are more complex.81  Such rules also 
might appear to be more equitable.82Because regulators are usually accountable in some way to 
legislators, the appearance of fairness is very important as a “legislator is likely to be unhappy 
with regulators…who fail, in the legislator’s view, to remember the industries and the workers in 
his area.”83  Regulated industries, on the other hand, “want protection from competition, from 
                                                 
75Id. 
76Id. 
77Id. 
78Id. 
79Id. 
80Id. 
81Id. 
82Id. 
83Id. 
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technological change, and from losses that threaten profits and jobs.” 84  The right kind of 
regulations can accomplish all of these anticompetitive goals, while at the same time “giving the 
citizenry the impression that the only goal is to serve the public interest.”85  Yandle calls this 
idea the “Bootleggers and Baptists” theory of regulation: 
Bootleggers, you will remember, support Sunday closing laws that shut down all 
the local bars and liquor stores. Baptists support the same laws and lobby 
vigorously for them. Both parties gain, while the regulators are content because 
the law is easy to administer.86 
With the government and private interest groups benefiting as a result of a given anticompetitive 
law that appears to serve the public interest, the barriers to meaningful reform are institutional—
that is, unless there are changes in the demand and in the supply of regulation.87 
Given the inefficiency and the ineffectiveness of the current higher education 
accreditation system, the question remains—does Yandle’s Bootleggers and Baptists theory have 
any application to the system of higher education accreditation as we know it? 
IV. Higher Education Accreditation: A Bootleggers and Baptists Story? 
                                                 
84Id. 
85Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists in the Market for Regulation, in Jason Shogren (ed.) The Political 
Economy of Government Regulation, Springer (1989). 
86 Yandle, supra note 7, at 13. 
87Id. at 14 (“What all this implies is that the challenges of regulatory reform are institutional. Regulation is relief for 
some and a burden for others, so that reform is a burden for some and a relief for others. The fact that a regulation 
has come into being as a result of a costly political exchange means that reform can hardly be gained easily. This is 
not to suggest that all is for naught, that there are no opportunities for reducing net (overall) regulatory costs or 
removing the protective regulatory cocoons woven so tightly and carefully around this activity and that. But it is to 
say that we can scarcely expect full-scale deregulation to occur often. Not when the Baptists and the bootleggers 
vote together.”). 
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Under Yandle’s theory, the government and interests groups have different reasons for 
promoting regulations that are inefficient overall.  Generally speaking, interests groups want 
protection from competition, and regulators want to minimize their costs.88  But, key to a good 
Bootleggers and Baptists story is “an overarching public concern to be addressed (like the 
problem of alcohol) whose ‘solution’ allows resources to be distributed from the public purse to 
particular groups or from one group to another (as from bartenders to bootleggers).”89  In Section 
II. A., we discussed some of these public concerns when we considered the public goods—such 
as quality assurance and information-signaling—that accreditation purportedly provides.  We 
now reflect on the accrediting agencies’ and the government’s interests in the current 
accreditation system in order to gauge how well Yandle’s story applies in this context. 
Unlike most other regulated sectors, higher education is primarily self-regulated.90  In 
other words, while the Environmental Protection Agency, for instance, sets the emission 
standards that apply to businesses, accrediting commissions made up of members elected by 
member institutions set the standards for accreditation and thereby determine whether or not a 
given university can access federal funds.91  While advocates for accreditation argue that this 
                                                 
88Id. at 13. 
89Id. at 14. 
90Conflict or Convergence?, supra note 14. 
91See, e.g., WESTERN ASSOC. OF SCHOOLS AND COLLEGES CONST. art. 2, §3, https://78462f86-a-8550000f-s-
sites.googlegroups.com/a/wascweb.org/www/2011%28Nov%29Constitution.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cpOQTNV9P5
vI5xeOHQAqlAYQ8_4ciQ1P70pByUUjlXZA32FZvM90769pvMt2_X3JvtuNeaG4RCi8mM61dGm4xRLV75bT7e
DCH8gk6IJQk4b1G3DO78j9OZwIqrZNOXcmD7DdjljnOgBanpdaw9PKHhA34hxsKUT0vnnGucYN-
4iwyX4LywK6lTlzSuDlZahZIGI_iQIsQDAO2RlxInUyOEKA8YNXg%3D%3D&attredirects=1; Commission 
Organization ,SOUTHERN ASSOC. OF COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS COMMISSION ON COLLEGES, 
http://www.sacscoc.org/commorg1.asp;  Northwest Commission on Colleges and Universities Bylaws art. 3, § 3.6, 
http://www.nwccu.org/About/By%20Laws/NWCCU%20ByLaws.htm#NominatingCommittee (member institutions 
must choose the agencies commissioners both from among the public and from the diversity of higher education 
institutions in the Northwest region); North Central Association Bylaws 2010 art. 6, § 1, 
http://www.ncahlc.org/About-the-Commission/personnel-governance.html; New England Assoc. of Schools and 
Colleges, http://cihe.neasc.org/about_us/commissioners/. 
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structure is one of the strengths of accreditation,92 even these advocates recognize that there is, at 
the very least, a potential for conflict.93 As Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder have suggested, 
however, this potential has long been realized: 
One might even view accreditation as a “cartel” made up of various participants 
with the goal of restricting competition from non-members of the cartel. 
Ultimately, it’s not surprising that “a system that is created, maintained, paid for 
and governed by institutions is necessarily more likely to look out for institutional 
interests.” One of the ways in which they do so is by keeping standards low: 
“when the people who decide what constitutes academic quality will themselves 
be judged on academic quality, it’s no wonder that the bar is set low.”94 
In this view, accrediting agencies protect institutional interests by keeping barriers to entry high, 
such that member universities face little competition from emerging non-member universities, 
and by keeping quality standards among member institutions low.  Thus, accrediting standards 
requiring a high-level of expensive inputs (e.g., an institution’s physical infrastructure, the size 
of its faculty and its non-faculty staff) make accreditation practically unattainable for many 
upstart universities.95  At the same time, with quality monitored by accrediting commissions 
                                                 
92See Judith Eaton, Federalizing Accreditation: A Quandary for Higher Education, COUNCIL OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
ACCREDITATION (Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter Federalizing Accreditation], (arguing that “it is precisely the 
traditional, disciplined distance of government authority over higher education that has enabled the establishment of 
our diverse, effective and highly respected higher education enterprise”).   
93See Conflict or Convergence, supra note 14 (“Institutions and programs not only established these [accrediting] 
bodies, but remain key sources of ongoing finance and governance. The financing of accreditation by those who are 
accredited means that there is ongoing pressure on accreditation to avoid conflict of interest such as deriving 
financial benefit from expanding the number of accredited institutions or programs. Governing accreditation by 
those who are themselves accredited raises other conflict concerns, such as avoiding temptation to relax the rigor of 
quality standards in order to expand membership.”). 
94 Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 9. 
95Id. at 43 (“Perhaps accreditors are essentially acting as a cartel, seeking to restrict entry into the sector without 
imposing too much of a burden on existing cartel members. This can be accomplished by defining and enforcing 
detailed standards that existing members can already meet, such as classroom space and library size, but that new 
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composed of member institution electors—many of whom are often faculty or staff of these 
institutions—the commissions on their own have little incentive to raise quality standards in a 
meaningful way for fear that their own institutions could not meet those standards.  Further, 
individually, commissioners are accountable to no one but the member institutions who elect 
them.  Therefore, the commission, as a whole, has an incentive not to raise standards higher than 
those that these institutions will be willing to meet.  The current system supports this hypothesis, 
as accreditors do not judge the “quality” of a university based on clear objective criteria.  Rather, 
the agencies base its judgments about an institution’s quality on its inputs96 and on the 
institution’s own subjective judgment as to how it has met the goals that an institution has set for 
itself.97 
If, as was traditionally the case, accreditation is the only practical impediment to 
obtaining federal funds,98 the accrediting agencies also have an effective means of punishing 
defection—the threat of losing (or never gaining) accreditation and the federal funds that come 
with it.99  Although the agencies have rarely wielded this tool for reasons of educational 
quality,100 in recent years, these agencies have not been shy about threatening to punish schools 
for reasons that have nothing to do with academics or with quality.  
                                                 
entrants would find prohibitively costly. If this is the case, standards would not be imposed for anything that would 
impose more costs on existing colleges than on new entrants.”). 
96See supra notes 42-49. 
97See supra note 54. 
98 Although the HEA of 1965 required both accreditation and state authorization, according to the Department of 
Education, there has been much concern that states are providing little or no oversight and, instead, relying 
completely on accreditors to provide quality assurance.  See Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,859 (“We are 
concerned that States have not consistently provided adequate oversight, and thus we believe Federal funds and 
students are at risk as we have anecdotally observed institutions shopping for States with little or no oversight.”).  
The Department of Education cited this reason for establishing minimum requirements that a state must fulfill in 
order to authorize a post-secondary school.  See 34 C.F.R. § 600.9. 
99 See Brown, supra note 58 (“Frankly, there's nothing more intimidating to schools—public or private—than the 
threat of losing accreditation and with it federal financial aid.”). 
100 See Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 12 (“While accreditation is rarely denied or revoked for 
educational reasons, there are institutions that are denied accreditation, so we know that the accreditors are 
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In 2007, for instance, the University of California drew fire from Western Association of 
Schools and Colleges (“WASC”) when it attempted to address runaway administrative costs by 
making modest salary and benefit changes.101  For years, school administrators had accepted 
exorbitant salaries that had gone unapproved by the university’s Board of Regents as required by 
the school’s compensation policy.102  As the Board attempted to deal with this problem, WASC 
also forced it to expend precious time and resources responding to WASC’s criticisms, including 
the complaint that “the Regents are sometimes unnecessarily harsh in their treatment of UC 
administrators, faculty, and staff.”103 
Similarly, the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (“SACS”) officially 
sanctioned the University of Virginia (“UVA”) and placed its accreditation on warning status. 
Why?  It was not because of academic quality.  Indeed, UVA is consistently ranked among the 
top universities in the country.104  Rather, the SACS official sanction came as a result of its 
Board of Visitors’ decision to remove the university president, Teresa Sullivan, in favor of one 
more focused on cost controls.105  Between 2003 and 2009, administrative costs at the university 
had risen 68.9% compared to the 42.4% rise in spending on teaching.106 At the same time, 
alumni giving had dropped by almost half.  In 2010, the Board had hired Ms. Sullivan to put 
UVA’s fiscal house in order.107  After her election, however, Ms. Sullivan made it clear that she 
                                                 
providing certification of something. Unfortunately, that ‘something’ has little relation to the quality of education 
provided.”). 
101 See Brown, supra note 58. 
102The University of California, Task Force on UC Compensation, Accountability, and Transparency Report (April 
2006), preamble at 1.  
103John T. Casteen III, Cameron Howell, William E Kirwan, and Kitty Lagareta, Report of the WASC Special Visit 
Team (October 23-October 24, 2007), at 15.  
104http://www.virginia.edu/Facts/Glance_Rankings.html. 
105Brown, supra note 58. 
106 Editorial, The Virginia Fracas: U.Va.'s faculty revolts when the trustees move against the status quo, Wall Street 
Journal (25 June 2012); https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304765304577481043087404280. 
107Id. 
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was not going to take aggressive measures to effect full-scale reform.108  Sullivan preferred, as 
she called it, an “incrementalist approach.”109  Indeed, in March 2011, she remarked that UVA 
was “pretty lean” and that she “worr[ied] about getting leaner.”110  Meanwhile, the Board was 
concerned that the university was falling behind other top universities such as Harvard and MIT 
who had entered the digital age with innovative online offerings.111  It also demanded more 
accountability in terms of faculty productivity and academic quality.112  In June 2012, Helen 
Dragas, UVA Rector, asked for Sullivan’s resignation on behalf of a supermajority of the 
Board.113  This decision was supported by the UVA Faculty Senate which passed a no-
confidence vote shortly after Dragas asked for Sullivan’s resignation.114  Although the Board 
later reversed this decision, SACS sanctioned UVA, placing its accreditation status up for review 
based on the university’s failure “to demonstrate compliance with Core Requirement 2.2 
(Governing board) and Comprehensive Standard 3.7.5 (Faculty role in governance) of the 
Principles of Accreditation.”115  Again, as Executive Vice President and Provost John D. Simon 
noted in the university’s official statement, “This action does not imply any criticism of the 
University's academic quality and programs.”116  Instead, by this action, SACS effectively 
diverted the university’s focus from critical issues of quality and of cost-containment to 
                                                 
108Id. 
109Id. 
110Id. 
111http://www.virginia.edu/presidentialtransition/120621dragas.html; http://fhe.gmu.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Statement-from-Rector-Helen-Dragas-June-21-2012.pdf; 
https://news.virginia.edu/content/deans-ask-sullivans-reinstatement-dragas-offers-further-explanation-her-removal-
bov-sets. 
112Id. 
113Id. 
114Editorial, supra note 105 at 106. 
115Southern Association of Colleges and Schools Commission on Colleges, Disclosure Statement Regarding the 
Status of University of Virginia Charlottesville, Virginia Issued December 20, 2012 by SACS Commission on 
Colleges (on file with authors).  
116University of Virginia, SACS Issues Warning to University, Press Release, (11 December 2012). 
http://news.virginia.edu/content/sacs-issues-warning-university. 
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unrelated issues of university governance.  Rather than developing smart and aggressive 
measures to balance fiscal concerns and to innovate, the Board was “provid[ing] clarity on 
procedures for electing and removing presidents, set[ting] up comprehensive guidelines for 
evaluating a president’s performance, and provid[ing] more direct involvement by faculty in 
board deliberations.”117  It was on defense to protect UVA’s accreditation on which depended 
both its access to federal funds and, in a very real way, its survival. 
The tremendous lengths that innovative online universities, such as Western Governors’ 
University (WGU),118 have had to endure in order to obtain accreditation further evidences the 
barriers that accreditors have erected to protect their institutional interests—barriers that have 
prevented lower cost and higher quality education.119  WGU began as an idea conceived at a 
meeting of the Western Governors Association in 1995.120  These state governors were 
concerned that their state university systems were not providing enough skilled graduates to 
ensure the quality workforce that the states needed.121  With the costs of education rising and 
state funds dwindling, these governors wanted to develop an innovative system that actually 
                                                 
117http://news.virginia.edu/content/sacs-issues-warning-university. 
118Burke & Butler, supra note 1 (“Founded by 19 governors, Western Governors University provides online 
competency-based degrees. WGU is a fully accredited competency-based model for the country…Western 
Governors University’s model is distinct, save for a few other institutions such as University Now’s New Charter 
University: Students pay for tuition every six months and are assessed a flat-rate fee, paying only for the amount of 
time it takes to complete a particular program. Students finishing in less time save money; the faster a student 
progresses, WGU notes, the more money the student saves. The university does not ‘rely on classes in the traditional 
sense.’ Instead of accumulating credit hours based on the amount of time spent in a particular course, students 
complete assessments measuring skills in a given subject area… While WGU was the first fully online university to 
receive accreditation, this distinction (such as it is) required a long, drawn-out process. But the years-long 
bureaucratic slog culminated in WGU’s earning accreditation from four agencies.”). 
119Richard Vedder, Accreditors—Hip Deep in Politics, MINDING THE CAMPUS (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://www.mindingthecampus.com/originals/2013/03/the_politicization_of_accredit.html (“The accrediting 
agencies are controlled by academics from traditional institutions who want any excuse to use their accrediting 
power to suppress the for-profit schools that have captured close to 10 percent of the market.”).  
120Chip Johnstone, Odyssey of an Innovation: The Regional Accreditation of Western Governors University, The 
Council for Adult and Experiential Learning (2006). 
121Id.  
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expanded access to educational opportunities.122  Further, to ensure the skill of graduates, they 
wanted a system that would reward competency, not time spent in the classroom.123  To realize 
this dream, ten governors donated $100,000 dollars apiece to establish WGU, a non-profit, 
private university with only online course offerings.124  But, this money would be the only state 
funding the university would receive.125  Although the governors were hesitant to pursue 
accreditation as it “was part of the problem, not the solution,”126 it became clear that in order to 
compete with other institutions and to obtain some credibility in the academic arena they had to 
pursue accreditation.127  They also hoped that they might effect educational change if they 
attempted to work within the accreditation system.128  The process to obtain regional 
accreditation, however, took so long—seven years—that it is a wonder that the school was able 
to remain open.129  By 2000, two years after WGU began accepting applications, the entire 
university had only two hundred students.130 As WGU slogged through the bureaucratic 
accrediting process, many other online universities bypassed the entire system by purchasing 
bankrupt traditional universities and assuming their accreditation.131Although WGU eventually 
obtained accreditation and has since flourished with over 25,000 students enrolled as of 2011,132 
as Chip Johnstone, Provost and Academic Vice President of WGU, writes, “It will be a rare 
                                                 
122Id. 
123Id. 
124Id. 
125Id. 
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127Id. 
128Id. 
129Id. 
130John Gravois, The College For-profits should Fear, Washington Monthly (September/October 2011).  
131Id.; Also see, Golden, supra note 67;  
132Id. Note that, although Western Governors’ University has the “lowest graduation rate” among private, nonprofit 
universities, see Lynn O’Shaughnessy, 50 private colleges with best, worst grad rates, CBS News Money Watch (8 
October 2012), as John Gravois points out, the numbers are very deceptive: “As a matter of policy, the government 
determines graduation rates by looking only at students who are attending college for the first time and on a full-
time basis—in short, the most conventional undergraduates. Like most schools that serve the ‘nontraditional’ 
demographic, WGU points out that this set of criteria leaves out the vast bulk of its own student body.”   
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institution, especially a private one, that can sustain itself throughout the five to eight years that it 
ordinarily takes to achieve initial regional accreditation. That is the one way in which the 
regional process most threatens the survival of innovation.”133 
Of course, in order for the accrediting agencies to have the enormous power it now 
enjoys over federal dollars, they must have the federal government’s blessing.  As Yandle 
suggested, a government regulator often chooses the approach that minimizes its own costs, 
regardless of how inefficient that approach might be overall.134  Indeed, according to Leef and 
Burris, a majority in both houses of Congress chose to delegate this power over federal funds to 
these private accreditors because they “fear[ed] a backlash from the education community if the 
government set standards for colleges and universities.”135  Consistent with Yandle’s theory, 
legislators chose a system that minimized their own political liability.136  Originally, the system 
also minimized costs of enforcement because, under the 1952 Korean War GI Bill, the 
Commissioner of Education needed only to designate a list of accrediting agencies he determined 
to be reliable authorities.137  As the years have gone by and the failures of the accreditation 
system have become more and more evident, the costs to the government have changed and, as a 
result, it has become increasingly involved in regulating these private regulators of higher 
education.138  Indeed, as Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder observe, there was even some discussion 
                                                 
133Johnstone, supra note 120.  
134Yandle, supra note 7, at 13. 
135Leef & Burris, supra note 42, at 35. 
136 See Yandle, supra note 7, at 13. 
137 See Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 4. 
138 See Leef & Burris, supra note 42, at 10 (“By the early 1990s, default rates on federally guaranteed student loans 
had reached about $3 billion annually. Congress searched for a means of reducing those losses, and came to view the 
accreditation process as contributing to the accountability problem in the student aid programs. In 1992, the 
Education Department Inspector General testified before the House Education and Labor Committee that, ‘billions 
of dollars available to students each year through loans and grants are at risk, in part because the recognition process 
does not assure that the accrediting agencies use appropriate and effective policies to accredit schools.’ Thus, the 
accrediting associations were assigned the blame, at least in part, for the managerial problems of the federal student 
loan program.”). 
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prior to the 1992 Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act to sever completely the tie 
between accreditation and federal funding.139  Although Congress did not take this tack, it 
responded with the 1992 Amendments “designed to strengthen the requirements that accrediting 
agencies would have to meet in order to be recognized by the Department of Education.”140 
Among these Amendments were provisions requiring the accrediting agencies “to use certain 
procedures, including periodic on-site inspections and reviews, well-trained and knowledgeable 
accreditation teams, and to make public the information on their standards, appeal procedures, 
and the accreditation status of each institution under its jurisdiction.”141 
The government’s increasing involvement in accreditation remains consistent with 
Yandle’s theory.  The government, he explained, might begin to change its approach to 
regulation in response to changes in the supply and in the demand for regulation.142  Prior to the 
1992 Amendments, a high annual rate of default on federally guaranteed student loans and an 
impression that the accreditation system was partly to blame changed the supply and the demand 
for government oversight over accreditation.143  The government has progressively increased its 
oversight of accrediting agencies by requiring the accreditors to fulfill a number of requirements 
in order for them to be recognized accrediting agencies by the Department of Education.144 
The higher education community’s response to these heightened requirements further 
suggests that quality assurance is not foremost in these accreditors’ minds.  Indeed, on October 
                                                 
139Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 5. 
140Leef & Burris, supra note 42, at 10. 
141Id. 
142 See Yandle, supra note 7, at 14-16. To the extent that this new regulatory approach reflects a change in the 
thinking both of members of Congress and of regulators at the Department of Education, then this change reflects a 
change in the supply of regulation.  But, to the extent that pressure from voters and pro-market higher education 
reform groups, such as ACTA, have motivated this change in regulatory policy, then this change also reflects a 
change in the demand for regulation. 
143Leef & Burris, supra note 42, at 10. 
144 See Federalizing Accreditation, supra note 92. 
Smith/Hall 28 
 
29, 2010, the Department of Education promulgated 34 C.F.R. §600.9—a regulation that laid out 
minimum requirements that a state must follow in order for it to authorize a post-secondary 
school.145  Prior to promulgating this regulation, state authorization was a requirement to 
receiving federal funds.146  What licensure actually entailed, however, was left to the discretion 
of the state.  As the Department of Education noted in responding to comments concerning § 
600.9, it issued this regulation because of concerns that states were not providing “adequate 
oversight.”147 To address these concerns, this regulation would require the states to serve as “an 
additional check on institutional integrity.”148  Specifically, the regulation required states to 
establish a third-party “process to review and appropriately act on complaints concerning the 
institution including enforcing applicable State laws.”149  It also conditioned state licensure on 
                                                 
14534 C.F.R. § 600.9 (“(a) (1) An institution described under §§ 600.4, 600.5, and 600.6 is legally authorized by a 
State if the State has a process to review and appropriately act on complaints concerning the institution including 
enforcing applicable State laws, and the institution meets the provisions of paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(ii), or (b) of 
this section.(i) (A) The institution is established by name as an educational institution by a State through a charter, 
statute, constitutional provision, or other action issued by an appropriate State agency or State entity and is 
authorized to operate educational programs beyond secondary education, including programs leading to a degree or 
certificate.(B) The institution complies with any applicable State approval or licensure requirements, except that the 
State may exempt the institution from any State approval or licensure requirements based on the institution's 
accreditation by one or more accrediting agencies recognized by the Secretary or based upon the institution being in 
operation for at least 20 years.(ii) If an institution is established by a State on the basis of an authorization to conduct 
business in the State or to operate as a nonprofit charitable organization, but not established by name as an 
educational institution under paragraph (a)(1)(i) of this section, the institution—(A) By name, must be approved or 
licensed by the State to offer programs beyond secondary education, including programs leading to a degree or 
certificate; and(B) May not be exempt from the State's approval or licensure requirements based on accreditation, 
years in operation, or other comparable exemption.(2) The Secretary considers an institution to meet the provisions 
of paragraph (a)(1) of this section if the institution is authorized by name to offer educational programs beyond 
secondary education by—(i) The Federal Government; or(ii) As defined in 25 U.S.C. 1802(2), an Indian tribe, 
provided that the institution is located on tribal lands and the tribal government has a process to review and 
appropriately act on complaints concerning an institution and enforces applicable tribal requirements or laws. 
(b) (1) Notwithstanding paragraph (a)(1)(i) and (ii) of this section, an institution is considered to be legally 
authorized to operate educational programs beyond secondary education if it is exempt from State authorization as a 
religious institution under the State constitution or by State law.(2) For purposes of paragraph (b)(1) of this section, 
a religious institution is an institution that—(i) Is owned, controlled, operated, and maintained by a religious 
organization lawfully operating as a nonprofit religious corporation; and(ii) Awards only religious degrees or1 
certificates including, but not limited to, a certificate of Talmudic studies, an associate of Biblical studies, a bachelor 
of religious studies, a master of divinity, or a doctor of divinity.”). 
14620 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). 
147Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,859, http://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister/finrule/2010-
4/102910a.html. 
148 Id. at 66,866. 
14934 C.F.R. § 600.9 (a) (1). 
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the institution’s compliance with “any applicable State approval or licensure requirements.”150 
Section 600.9 did not give the state any new power.  Under 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), the states 
already had the power to withhold federal funds by refusing to license an institution of higher 
education.151  Rather, the regulation defined the “minimum standards” that the state must meet in 
order to fulfill the duty Congress delegated to the state to authorize institutions eligible to receive 
federal funds.152  In effect, because the accreditors’ consistent failure with respect to quality 
assurance, the Department of Education appealed to the states to step up and to provide that 
“additional check on institutional integrity” that the Higher Education Act of 1965 and its 
subsequent reauthorizations envisioned.153 
The response from the accreditation community was blistering.  Although the regulation 
gave states no new authority, accreditors were up in arms.154  Molly Corbett Broad, President of 
the American Council on Education, wrote a letter on behalf of sixty higher education 
associations and accrediting organizations to Department of Education Secretary Arne Duncan, 
                                                 
15034 C.F.R. § 600.9 (a) (1) (B). 
15120 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). 
152Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,858, http://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister/finrule/2010-
4/102910a.html; 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). 
153See Program Integrity Issues, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,858. http://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister/finrule/2010-
4/102910a.html(“In accordance with the provisions of the HEA, the Department is establishing minimum standards 
to determine whether an institution is legally authorized to offer postsecondary education by a State for purposes of 
Federal programs. The proposed regulations do not seek to regulate what a State must do, but instead considers 
whether a State authorization is sufficient for an institution that participates, or seeks to participate, in Federal 
programs.”); 20 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). 
154According to OpenSecrets.org, both SACS independently and the American Council on Education (whose 
President penned letters to the Secretary of Education, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, and 
the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions on behalf of five of the six regional accrediting 
agencies) lobbied in support of H.R. 2127 in 112th Congress to repeal § 600.9.  
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/billsum.php?id=1508.  Note that H.R. 2127 passed the House but died in the 
Senate.  See http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:h.r.2117. Note also that Association for Private Sector 
Colleges and Universities brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
challenging § 600.9.  In a decision that was affirmed by the D.C. Circuit, the court vacated a provision related to 
state authorization of distance education (§ 600.9 (c)), but left the rest of the regulation untouched.  See 
https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2011cv0138-28; 
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/opinions.nsf/969CEC5FCB92F81685257A14004F3131/$file/11-5174-
1377087.pdf.  
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asking the Secretary to rescind § 600.9 in its entirety.155  In similar letters to the House 
Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Senate Health, Education, Labor and 
Pensions Committee, Broad appealed to Congress to take action to expressly repeal these 
regulations.156  In particular, she criticized the state authorization provision as “a significant 
intrusion into prerogatives properly reserved to the states.”157  Despite Ms. Broad’s rhetorically 
appealing assertion that § 600.9 removed discretion from the states, the text of the regulation 
belies her argument.  Indeed, under § 600.9 (a) (1) (i) (B), a state “may exempt the institution 
from any State approval or licensure requirements based on the institution's accreditation by one 
or more accrediting agencies recognized by the Secretary or based upon the institution being in 
operation for at least 20 years.”158  The discretion to grant or deny that exemption, however, rests 
with the state.  Further, although the regulation does require the state to set up a “process to 
review and appropriately act on complaints concerning the institution including enforcing 
applicable State laws,” the regulation does not require that the state pass any particular 
regulations or establish any particular process.159  This regulation did not threaten state 
autonomy—it threatened the accreditors’ supremacy.  
                                                 
155 Letter from Molly Corbett Broad, President American Council on Education, to Secretary Arne Duncan, U.S. 
Department of Education (March 2, 2011) (on file with the author).  
156 Letter from Molly Corbett Broad, President American Council on Education, to the Honorable John Kline and 
The Honorable George Miller, Chairman and Ranking member – respectively – of the U.S. House Committee on 
Education and the Workforce, (April 26, 2011) (on file with the authors); letter from Molly Corbett Broad, President 
American Council on Education, to the Honorable Tom Harkin and The Honorable Michael B. Enzi, Chairman and 
Ranking member – respectively – of the U.S. Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Workforce, (April 26, 
2011) (on file with the authors). 
157 Id. 
15834 C.F.R. § 600.9 (a) (1) (i) (B) (emphasis added). 
159http://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister/finrule/2010-4/102910a.html, (“The proposed regulations do not seek 
to regulate what a State must do, but instead considers whether a State authorization is sufficient for an institution 
that participates, or seeks to participate, in Federal programs.”). 
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While the 1992 Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act had sought to improve 
quality by instituting controls over the accrediting agencies themselves160—controls that, as we 
have discussed, the accrediting agencies could evade by putting in place vague and meaningless 
quality standards—this new Department of Education regulation actually threatened the status 
quo by requiring the state to fill its role as an overseer of quality independent of the accrediting 
agencies.161  As Judith S. Eaton lamented, § 600.9 “may require that states not only authorize 
institutions to operate but now also monitor that operation, affecting both public and private 
institutions, in some cases mirroring accreditation.”162 Ultimately, this was the fear—that the 
government had set up an independent system that “mirrored” accreditation, that states could 
undermine the accreditation cartel if they chose to take a more active role in overseeing higher 
education.  In Broad’s letters to the House and Senate Committees on higher education, she 
bristled at the thought of “inappropriate state involvement in the academic decision-making of 
private non-profit institutions, in particular for religiously affiliated institutions.”163  What Broad 
left unsaid in this letter—written on behalf of five of the six regional accreditors—is that, as 
SACS’ recent sanctioning of the University of Virginia suggests, “inappropriate involvement in 
the academic decision-making” had hitherto been the exclusive province of the accrediting 
agencies.  While Broad’s parade of horribles includes concerns about the plight of non-profit 
religious affiliated institutions, she failed to mention that the accreditors themselves have a long 
history of inappropriately interfering in the prerogatives of non-profit religious institutions.  In 
the early 1990s, for instance, WASC held up the reaccreditation of St. Thomas Aquinas College, 
                                                 
160 See Leef & Burris, supra note 42, at 10. 
161Note that § 600.9 (a) (1) (i) (B) allows a state to “exempt the institution from any State approval or licensure 
requirements based on the institution's accreditation by one or more accrediting agencies recognized by the 
Secretary or based upon the institution being in operation for at least 20 years.”  The discretion to grant or deny that 
exemption, however, rests with the state. 
162 See Eaton, supra note 92, at 1.  
163 See Broad, supra note 156.  
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an eminent conservative Catholic institution known for its rigorous Great Books program, 
because it refused to allow accreditors “to single out minority students for a special meeting with 
the [accrediting] team members in order to address special ‘minority issues.’”164  The college 
took this stand because it was its policy, grounded in the intellectual tradition to which the school 
is so devoted, to deal with students without regard to their race.165  Although WASC ultimately 
relented and reaccredited Aquinas in 1993,166 the incident exemplifies a critical point relative to 
the concerns that Broad raises in her letters to Congress.  The accrediting agencies are not 
concerned about institutional autonomy.  They are not concerned about the plight of non-profit 
religious institutions of higher learning.  They are concerned about state oversight undermining 
the status quo.   
For decades, the accreditors have enjoyed a system by which quality standards have 
remained low while the costs of complying with these standards have remained high.  
Competition from an independent state system of oversight threatens in a number of ways the 
comfortable cartel the accreditors have managed for all of these years.  First, if state oversight 
vastly improves the quality of colleges and universities in an observable manner, Congress could 
decide to scrap entirely the private accreditation condition for obtaining federal funds, as 
members of Congress considered doing in 1992.167  While private accreditation would likely 
remain, an institution’s incentive to seek it would vastly change, as would the accreditors’ ability 
to extract monopoly rents from member institutions.168  Second, if the states took seriously their 
                                                 
164 Linda Seebach, Accreditation Standards Threaten Diversity of Opinion on University Campuses, Los Angeles 
Daily News (4 November 1993).  
165Id; M. Ali Raza, A Janell Anderson, & Harry Glynn, The Ups and Downs of Affirmative Action Preferences, 
Greenwood Publishing (1999), p. 116.  
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167Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 5. 
168Gillen, Bennett & Vedder, supra note 2, at 31 (“Accreditation would once again be completely voluntary, and 
because accreditors would nolonger have quasi-governmental power, they could no longer essentially force 
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role of authorizing institutions of higher education and ensuring educational quality, state 
licensure could become an independent and meaningful mark of quality for consumers, 
employers, and other graduate institutions.  Thus, schools—such as Christendom College, 
Thomas Aquinas College, and Hillsdale College—that choose not to accept federal funds169 
could forego the costly accreditation process entirely by obtaining an independent stamp of 
quality assurance from the states in which they operate.  This development would again 
eliminate the accreditors’ ability to extract rents from such institutions.   
The question remains, however, would a system of strong state involvement in higher 
education quality assurance be desirable?  Going forward, how should Congress reform the 
system? 
 
V. Recommendations 
The current system of higher education quality assurance is broken.  In the past the 
Department of Education has taken a step toward fixing these issues by encouraging stronger 
state involvement in quality assurance through its promulgation of § 600.9.  We recommend, 
however, that Congress go a step further by completely severing the tie between eligibility to 
accept federal funds and higher education accreditation.  Congress should fully entrust the job of 
quality assurance to the states, with state authorization being the only prerequisite for eligibility 
to receive federal dollars.  Such a proposal would likely receive the same kind of backlash that 
                                                 
institutions to do what theywished. This would allow colleges to ignore inappropriate recommendations from 
accreditors.”). 
169http://www.thomasaquinas.edu/admission/financial-aid; http://www.christendom.edu/aid/federal.php; 
http://www.hillsdale.edu/admissions/faq/faq_list.asp?iSectionID=1&iGroupID=45&iQuestionID=108. 
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the promulgation of § 600.9 evoked—charges that requiring state authorization would lead to 
“inappropriate state involvement” in academic decision-making.170  But, for many reasons, this 
system would better serve the interests of academic freedom and of quality assurance. 
Unlike regional accreditors, state officials are politically accountable.171  While regional 
accreditors can make costly demands on colleges and intervene in a university’s decision-making 
with impunity, state officials are either elected or accountable to someone who is elected.  The 
level of direct accountability would depend, of course, upon the system that the state established.  
State constitutions or statutes could create an entirely new elected office responsible for 
authorizing all universities that operate within the state. The individual holding this position 
would be directly accountable to the people and his interest in reelection would prevent him from 
instituting requirements that impinge upon academic or religious freedom or that substantially 
raise tuition costs.  Although voters are often individually rationally ignorant, collectively they 
have an incentive to monitor the actions elected officials for deviations from what the median 
voter might want.172  Higher education is an industry within states.  Universities directly employ 
citizens; most young people attend college after high school;173 businesses benefit from the 
influx of out of state students who become new customers; and state industries need members of 
a skilled work force.  Because any measures would directly affect so many citizens, voters, on 
                                                 
170See, e.g.,http://www.chea.org/pdf/Letter%20to%20KlineMiller_42611_FINAL.pdf; 
http://www.chea.org/pdf/Letter%20to%20Harkin%20and%20Enzi_42611_FINAL.pdf 
171Citizens also enjoy the protections of the Bill of Rights with respect to government actors.  By contrast, they have 
very little legal protection from the actions of accrediting agencies.  In reviewing the actions of accreditors, courts 
have held that these bodies which are even more unaccountable than independent government agencies deserve even 
more deference than federal agencies do.  See, e.g., Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 459 F.3d 705, 
713 (6th Cir. 2006) (“We emphasize, however, that while principles of federal administrative law provide guidance 
in our analysis, judicial review of accreditation decisions is more limited than review under the [Administrative 
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172 Bruce Bender and John Lott, Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature, 87 Public 
Choice (1996).  
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the margin, will determine that the benefits of remaining informed on issues of higher education 
outweigh its costs.  Further, most of the costs of monitoring could be borne by private watchdog 
groups who sound the alarm when an official does something improper such as PIRG—Public 
Interest Research Group—currently does.  In short, as Yandle might put it, voters demand for 
higher quality and lower cost higher education could incentivize state officials to increase the 
supply by developing outcome-based methods of assessing an institutions performance and by 
encouraging low-cost and innovative new educational programs.  Because they are not publicly 
accountable—elected by traditional universities institutionally opposed to innovation—the 
accreditors have no incentive to pursue such reforms. 
Another force would prevent a state from instituting heavy-handed or unnecessarily 
costly measures—that is, competition from other states in the markets both for students and for 
universities.  States have an incentive to attract out-of-state students and to persuade in-state 
students to remain at home.  At public universities, these out-of-state students pay substantially 
higher tuition rates than in-state students do.  As Scott Jaschik observes, “[T]he parents who 
must pay those bills vote in other states, so these tuition dollars are much less politically costly 
than those gained by raising in-state rates.”174  Out-of-state students subsidize the tuition of state 
residents.  At the same time, states must compete with the other states for these students.  This 
competition should drive states to pursue measures that lower costs both for in-state and for out-
of-state students and that increase the quality of universities within the state so that students will 
flock to them and, perhaps, decide to remain in the state after graduation, becoming permanent 
members of the tax base.  As members of the Western Governors Association recognized when 
they considered opening the fully online, competency-based university now known as WGU, 
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states have a strong incentive to keep costs low so that industries within each state will have the 
skilled work forces needed to make that state’s economy grow.175  Because the state currently 
shares responsibility for quality assurance with unaccountable accreditors, the state has 
abdicated much of its authority in this arena. 
Gillen, Bennett, and Vedder have considered and promptly rejected the idea of a 
centralized federal agency acting as an accreditor: “Rather than maintaining or encouraging 
diversity, every institution would be pushed towards a common politically popular vision once a 
set of universal standards were in place. In other words, an FDA for education ‘would represent 
the ultimate in centralization, standardization and uniformity.’”176  By contrast, a state-centered 
approach to quality assurance would also allow the states to experiment with different methods 
of measuring and of achieving student outcomes.  As methods of measuring student success 
improved, the market for higher education would function better because consumers would have 
more information available to them on the academic quality of institutions.  States could choose 
to specialize in academic quality as Delaware has done in the area of corporate law.  Such 
specialization would not only benefit higher education in general, as other states might adopt 
some of the quality measures the specialist state has developed, but it would also benefit the state 
which would become known for its quality institutions and which might attract for-profit 
distance universities looking for a mark of quality. 
The market for universities—as states compete to attract new, innovative, and cost-
effective means to educate its citizens—would also lower barriers to entry for new, innovative 
universities.  If, for instance, one state imposed requirements on a new online university that 
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were too onerous, that university could look to forty-nine other states for authorization.  At the 
same time, market forces and public accountability would prevent a state from becoming a haven 
for diploma mills. 
Critical to our hypothesis is that voters keep their states accountable—that they demand 
reform and hold the state to its promises.  If they do, the states could spearhead much needed 
reform in higher education—reform that the accreditors have no incentive to pursue and that 
states have little incentive to undertake as long as they can pass the blame on to someone else. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The higher education system in this country is broken and, for over half of a century, the 
accreditation system presently in place has done little but exacerbate the problems. The key to 
reform is voter education on what the accreditation system is and what it is not.  As we have 
shown throughout this paper, accreditation says little to nothing about the academic quality of an 
institution.  Further, the costs associated with obtaining this meaningless mark of approval have 
contributed to making higher education unobtainable to some students and impractical for others.  
Although we attempted to provide some suggestions for reform, our intent in this paper was not 
to provide a “silver bullet” solution for a complicated problem.  Instead, ultimately, it was to 
show that the accreditors—bodies run by the institutions that they govern—do not have the 
proper incentives to effect meaningful reform.  Left to its own device, the state does not have an 
incentive to effect these reforms either.  But, educated and involved voters create the incentive to 
for state officials to act—not in the public interest, but in a way that is a rational response to the 
demands that voters place upon them.   
